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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs

Case no. 960149 CA
priority no. 2

KENNETH D. SOUZA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for: Count I:
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a
second degree felony; Count II: TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, a second
degree felony; Count III: FAILURE TO PAY DRUG STAMP TAX, a third
degree felony; COUNT IV: FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL
TO STOP, a third degree felony; Count V: POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHENALIA, a class B misdemeanor; and Count VI: RECKLESS
DRIVING, a class B misdemeanor; in the Fifth Judicial District
Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable
JAMES L. SHUMATE, Judge, presiding.
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. 0. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

JIM R. SCARTH (2870)
THOMAS A. BLAKELY (5589)
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the
above-entitled Court by §78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended,

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Is it reversible error for the prosecution to fail to

provide discovery or for the court to refuse to compel discovery?
a»

Should the prosecution have been ordered to provide

discovery regarding St. George police policies and procedures
regarding hot pursuit?
b.

Should the prosecution have been ordered to provide

discovery regarding their rebuttal witness?
2.

Was the Appellant prejudiced unfairly by having a defense

witness appear before the jury in shackles and prison clothes?
3.

Was the Appellant prejudiced by the court ordering a

witness transported prior to being called as a defense witness?
4.

was the Appellant entitled to being convicted of lesser

included offenses only?
a

Is the offense of failure to pay drug stamp tax a

lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute?
b
State

v.

Is the offense of reckless driving a lesser
Kenneth

D. Souza

Case No. 960149-CA

- Brief of Appellant
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included offense of failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop?
5.

Was there sufficient evidence given to the jury for the

return of a conviction of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute?
6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing

appellant to consecutive sentences without the benefit of a
presentence report?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I A & B:

The standard of review is whether the

discovery error by the State resulted in a resonable likelihood
of a more favorable result for the Appellant.

State

v.

680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984), cited in Salt

Lake

City

Reynolds,

Fontana,
v.

849 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1993).
POINT II and III:

Standard of review is to review the

record evidence and determine from a totality of the
circumstances whether the ruling is consistent with the
State

guarantees of due process.

v.

Ramirez,

817 P.2d 264, (Utah

1991) .
POINT IV A & B:

The question of an improper

conviction (multiple sentences rather than lesser included
offenses) is that of plain error, requiring a finding that (i) an
error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and (iii) the error
was harmful. State

v.

Brooks

State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA

(Brooks

II),

908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah

- Brief of Appellant
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See also

1995).

State

1994)(citing State

v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

POINT V:

The appellate Court is limited on a question

of sufficiency of the evidence to the question of whether the
jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants
were guilty.

See State

v. Romero,

1976), citing State v. Laub,
POINT VI:

State

554 P.2d 216 at 218,(Utah

102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805 (1942).
v. Stettina,

868 P.2d 108 at 109,

(Utah App. 1994) sets out the standard of review for a question
of an illegal sentence: it is a question of law, and questions of
law are reviewed for correctness.

See also

State

v. Souza,

846

P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah App.1993).

PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD
POINT I A:

Counsel made a Motion to Compel regarding

the policies and procedures of the St. George City Police, which
was denied by the trial court. A record was made for
preservation on appeal.

See

generally

Addendum

to

Appellant's

Brief.

POINT I B:
rebuttal witness (R.,

When the State called Kassie McArthur as a
p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1), the defense

objected on the grounds of surprise and the State's failure to
provide discovery {R.,

State

v.

Kenneth

p. 681, LI.9-13).

D. Souza

Case No. 960149-CA
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overruled {R.,

p. 681, LI. 17-19).

POINT II:

On the first day of trial and during the

State's case in chief, the Court requested that a defense
witness, Kim Randall, be called to testify out of turn and during
the State's case in chief (R.,

p. 457, 1. 24 - p. 458, 1. 9 ) .

That was done and when Kim Randall was brought into the courtroom
after a brief recess, he was in shackles and an orange prisoner's
uniform (R.,

p. 460, LI. 8-13).

Randall at that point.

The jury had not seen Mr.

Defense counsel, on the record, objected

to Mr. Randall appearing before the jury so dressed and in
shackles (R.,
objection (R.,

p. 460, LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the
p. 461, 1. 20 - p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall

testified before the jury in shackles and prisoner's clothes

[R.,

p. 463 - p. 482).
POINT III:

The defense witness, Kim Randall, was

brought to the

trial from the Kane County Jail pursuant to a

Transportation

Order signed by the Trial Judge herein prior to

the commencement of trial (R.,

p. 114-115).

That Order provided

that Mr. Randall would be held at the Washington County Jail
until the conclusion of trial {Id.,

p. 115). At the conclusion

of Mr. Randall's testimony on February 5, 1996, he was not
excused by the Court (J?., p. 482). On the second day of trial,
February 8, 1996, the defense called Mr. Randall to testify

State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA
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during the Appellant's case in chief and was informed that Mr.
Randall had been returned to Kane County (R.,

p. 677, LI. 12-18).

The Court denied Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to
testify in the Appellant's case in chief, and required defense
counsel to give a proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony
(R.,

p. 678, LI. 6-10).

The defense moved, on the record, for a

mistrial and that motion was denied (R.,

p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680,

1. 5) .
POINT IV A, B:

Plain error may be reviewed by the

Appellate court when raised for the first time on appeal.
State

v.

Brooks

(Brooks

POINT V:

II),

See

908 P.2d 856 at 861.

Sufficiency of evidence may be reviewed for

the first time on appeal.

State

218,(Utah 1976), citing State

v. Romero,

v. Laub,

554 P.2d 216 at

102 Utah 402, 131 P.2d 805

(1942).
POINT VI:
raised at any time.

An improper or illegal sentence may be
See

State

v.

Brooks

(Brooks

II),

supra

at

860.
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16(5) (b) :
The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon
as practicable following the filing of charges and
before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make
disclosure.

State

v.

Kenneth

D. Souza

Case No. 960149-CA
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Utah Code Annotated §76-3-401 (1), (3) :
(1)

A Court shall determine, if a defendant has been
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense,
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state
offenses shall run concurrently unless the Court
states in the sentence that they shall run
consecutively.
* * * * *

(3)

A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant
in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant/Defendant (hereinafter "Appellant") was charged
by Information with the following charges:

Count I: POSSESSION

OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second
degree felony; Count II: TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE, a second degree
felony; Count III: FAILURE TO PAY DRUG STAMP TAX, a third degree
felony; COUNT IV: FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP,
a third degree felony; Count V: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHENALIA,
a class B misdemeanor; and Count VI: RECKLESS DRIVING, a class B
misdemeanor.
The charges were taken to a jury trial before the Hon.
James L. Shumate.

After a two-day jury trial, Appellant was

found guilty of all charges.

State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA

- Brief of Appellant
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The police alleged that on May 16, 1995, the Appellant
was operating a motorcycle, east bound on St. George Boulevard
when officer Stoker observed a tail light assembly on the
motorcycle dangling down on the same (Record,

page 327, lines 1-

6); the officer turned on the motorcycle, observed the motorcycle
turn left onto 1-15 without signaling (R.,

p. 327, LI. 8-12), at

which time the officer engaged in a high speed chase of the
motorcycle south on 1-15. R., p. 328, LI 7-11.

According to the

officer, the Appellant was throwing objects during the chase

(R.,

p. 329, 1. 13 - p. 331, 1. 14). Officer Stoker testified that
the chase ended at the South St. George 1-15 off-ramp where the
Appellant's motorcycle ran into the a backup officer's patrol car
(R.,

p. 333, LI. 2-8). The Appellant was then arrested.
Officer Stoker testified that after the arrest he and

several other law enforcement officers went back to the freeway
to search for the items he had seen thrown by the Appellant(R.,
p. 343, LI. 1-11).

He found several pieces of hypodermic

syringes {R., p. 343, LI. 19-24), and later found a small plastic
bag with a white powdery substance inside of it (R., p. 346, LI.
2-10) which did not have a drug stamp affixed to it (R., p. 353,
LI. 6-11).

Jon Gerlitz from the State Crime Lab, in his

testimony, identified the substance in the plastic bag as being

State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA
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26.3 grams of methamphetamine (R, p. 451, LI. 10-12).
During the proceedings herein the Appellant filed a
Motion to Discover (R. , pp. 8-10) and later filed a Motion to
Compel and pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Appellant sought an order from the Court
compelling the prosecution to provide Appellant with a copy of
the St. George City Police Department's written Policies and
Procedure regarding police officer's "fresh or hot pursuit."

At

a hearing held on the Motion on September 27, 1995, the Trial
Judge denied Appellant's Motion to Compel from the bench.
Apparently no written order was ever filed.1
This case was tried by jury and the trial started on
February 5, 1996.

On the first day of trial and during the

State's case in chief, the Court requested that a defense
witness, Kim Randall, be called to testify out of turn and during
the State's case in chief (R., p. 457, 1. 24 - p. 458, 1. 9 ) .
That was done and when Kim Randall was brought into the courtroom
after a brief recess, he was in shackles and an orange prisoner's
uniform (R., p. 460, LI. 8-13).
Randall at that point.

The jury had not seen Mr.

Defense counsel objected to Mr. Randall

Htfhile there is nothing in the Court's Record to indicate a
written Motion to Compel or a formal written Order regarding this
matter, Appellant has obtained a certified transcript of the
hearing in which the Motion to Compel was ruled upon, and
includes the transcript as part of his Addendum to his Brief.
State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA

- Brief of Appellant
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appearing before the jury so dressed and in shackles (R.,
LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the objection (R.,

p. 460,

p. 461, 1. 20 -

p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall testified before the jury in
shackles and prisoner's clothes (R.,

p. 463 - p. 482).

The defense witness, Kim Randall, was brought to the
trial from the Kane County Jail pursuant to a Transportation
Order signed by the Trial Judge herein prior to the commencement
of trial (R. , p. 114-115).

That Order provided that Mr. Randall

would be held at the Washington County Jail until the conclusion
of trial {Id.,

p. 115). At the conclusion of Mr. Randall's

testimony on February 5, 1996, he was not excused by the Court
(R. , p. 482). On the second day of trial, February 8, 1996, the
defense called Mr. Randall to testify during the Appellant's case
in chief and was informed that Mr. Randall had been returned to
Kane County (R.,

p. 677, LI. 12-18).

The Court denied

Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to testify in the
Appellant's case in chief, and required defense counsel to give a
proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony (R.,

p. 678, LI. 6-

10) . The defense moved for a mistrial and that motion was deniec
{R.,

p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680, 1. 5).
The State called Kassie McArthur as a rebuttal witness

(R.,

p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1). The defense objected on the

grounds of surprise and the State's failure to provide discovery

State

v.

Kenneth

D. Souza

Case No. 960149-CA
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(J?., p. 681, LI. 9-13).
LI. 17-19).

The objection was overruled [R.,

p. 681,

Months prior to trial the defense had, through its

discovery motion, requested a list of witnesses that the State
intended to call to testify at trial (R.,

p. 9, M

4, 6 ) . The

State had not listed Kassie McArthur on any witness list provided
to the defense.

The State brought Kassi McArthur from the Utah

State prison to testify at the trial herein pursuant to an ex
parte motion for transportation order dated January 25, 1996 (JR.,
p. 106), with said order dated January 30, 1996 (R., p. 107).
The trial started February 5, 1996

(Id.)

The Appellant was found guilty of all counts by the jury
[R.,

p. 759, 1. 10 - p. 760, 1. 9 ) . The Appellant chose to waive

the time for sentencing (R.,

p. 762, LI. 20-24), and the Court

sentenced the Appellant to two consecutive terms of imprisonment
of not less than one year and not more than fifteen years.

The

Appellant was also sentenced to serve two concurrent zero to five
year terms and two concurrent County jail terms of six months
with the balance of the two six month terms being suspended

(R.,

p. 769, 1. 20-p. 772, 1. 10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I, A: The Appellant requested two pieces of
information from the State which were not in totality provided.
First, Appellant informally requested from the State a copy of

State
v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA

- Brief of Appellant
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the policies and procedures of St. George City Police regarding
high speed chases.

This request was denied by the State, and the

Appellant brought the issue to the Court, which denied the
motion.

Was this denial of Appellant's Motion to Compel

improper?
POINT I, B:

The State called a witness at trial as a

rebuttal witness, and gave no advance notice to Appellant that
this witness would be called.

Appellant had requested a list of

the State's witnesses in his Motion for Discovery, and the State
filed an ex parte transporation order with the Court more than a
week prior to trial requesting this witness for the trial. Did
the State violate their continuing duty to disclose discovery
under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?

Did the Court

improperly deny Appellant's Motion for Mistrial?

Did the Court

fail to take measures that would have lessened the impact of the
unexpected testimony on the Defendant?
POINT II: One of Appellant's witnesses, one Kim Randall,
was in the custody of the Kane County Sheriff's Department, and
testified in shackles and in a prisoner's uniform.

Appellant had

brought street clothes for Randall to dress in, and there was no
concern discussed by the Court or the State that Randall would
pose a security risk.

The judge refused to have the shackles

removed from Randall, and would not allow Randall to wear street
clothes.
State

v.

Did this improperly prejudice the Appellant?
Kenneth

D. Souza
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POINT III: Randall was ordered to be transported to the
Washington County Jail from the Kane County Jail for purposes of
testifying as a witness for the Appellant.

The transporation

order called for Randall to remain in Washington County until the
conclusion of the trial. Appellant called Randall on the first
day of trial, and wished to recall him on the second day of
trial.

Appellant was notified that Randall had been returned to

the Kane County Jail prior to that time.

The judge would not

allow the Appellant to present to the jury a proffer as to what
Randall's testimony would be. Appellant counted on the
availability of Randall until the conclusion of the trial. Did
Randall's unavailability unfairly prejudice the Appellant?
POINT IV: The Appellant is entited to be convicted of a
lesser included offense if he is convicted of two offenses, one
of which is the lesser included offense of the other.

POINT IV

A: Is the failure to pay drug stamp tax a lesser included offense
of possession of a controlled substance with itent to distribute?
POINT IV B: Is the offense of reckless driving a lesser included
offense of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop?
POINT V:

The arresting officer testified that the

Appellant threw certain items while trying to evade arrest.
Items were later found on the well-traveled highway which the
officer claimed were the same items that were thrown.

Was there

insufficient evidence presented by the State to tie this item of
State

v.

Kenneth

D. Souza
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evidence to the Appellant?
POINT VI: The Appellant waived the time for sentencing,
and the Court sentenced the Appellant to consecutive terms for
counts I and II without the assistance of a presentence report.
Was this sentencing to consecutive sentences without objective,
unbiased, information provided to the Court as to the Appellant's
history, character and rehabilitative needs an abuse of
discretion, and a violation of the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated §76-3-401(3)?
ARGUMENT
POINT I. IS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE PROSECUTION TO
FAIL TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY OR FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE TO COMPEL
DISCOVERY?
A.

SHOULD THE PROSECUTION HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PROVIDE
DISCOVERY REGARDING ST. GEORGE POLICE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES REGARDING HOT PURSUIT?

Prior to the jury trial, Appellant requested discovery of
the State, specifically requesting the policies and procedures of
the St. George Police Department regarding hot pursuit.

The

reason for requesting this was that the Appellant was captured
and arrested by police after a "hot pursuit" high speed chase.
During this pursuit, the State claims that the Appellant threw
items off of his person, which was later collected by police to
be used as evidence against the Appellant.

Appellant requested a

copy of the policies and procedures of the St. George Police
Department in an effort to determine whether or not the officer
State
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conducted the pursuit in conformity with those policies and
procedures.

The State refused to disclose whether there were

such policies and procedures, and the Trial Court refused to
compel the State to disclose said information (See,
Addendum,

generally,,

p. 8, LI. 19-25).
It is well settled that the prosecution must provide

Appellant with discovery when requested pursuant to Rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

See

United

States

v.

Bagley,

473

U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) and
State

v.

Knight,

734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987).

The question

is whether the policies and procedures of the St. George City
Police Department would come within the scope of Rule 16.
In the area of inventory searches of seized vehicles, the
Utah Supreme Court made it mandatory for inventory searches to be
conducted in conformity with standardized, specific procedures.
State v.

Shamblin,

Colorado

v.

(1987) .

The reason for the need of these procedures, inter

Bertine,

763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988), following
479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739
alia,

is to preclude the possibility that officers conducting the
searches will act arbitrarily.

Shamblin,

supra

at 428.

In much

the same way, Appellant should have been appraised as to whether
or not there were policies and procedures of the St. George City
Police Department regarding high speed chases.
governing high speed chases exist?
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v. Kenneth
D. Souza
Case No. 960149-CA

Did policies

Did the officer conform to

- Brief of Appellant
Page Number 14

those policies and procedures?

Also, was the evidence later

gathered in conformity with those policies?

These questions were

not answered, and the Court did not compel the State to answer.
The Appellant was prejudiced by this: if the officer did not
follow the proper hot pursuit procedures, this would be evidence
to impeach the officer as to whether or not he would follow
policies and procedures at other times. And, if there were
policies and procedures governing high speed chases, and the
gathering of evidence during and after high speed chases, whether
or not the St. George City Police adhered to those policies would
have had an impact as to whether or not the evidence was gathered
properly, and possibly should have been suppressed at trail.
B.

SHOULD THE PROSECUTION HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PROVIDE
DISCOVERY REGARDING THEIR REBUTTAL WITNESS?

The State called Kassie McArthur as a rebuttal witness
(J*., p. 680, 1. 25 - p. 681, 1. 1). The defense objected on the
grounds of surprise and the State's failure to provide discovery
(R. , p. 681, LI.9-13).
LI. 17-19).

The objection was overruled (R.,

p. 681,

Months prior to trial the defense had, through its

discovery motion, requested a list of witnesses that the State
intended to call to testify at trial (R.,

p. 9, If

4, 6). The

State had not listed Kassie McArthur on any witness list provided
to the defense.

The State brought Kassi McArthur from the Utah

State prison to testify at the trial herein pursuant to an ex
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parte motion for transportation order dated January 25, 1996

(R.,

p. 106), with said order dated January 30, 1996 {R., p. 107).
The trial started February 5, 1996

(Id.)

It is clear that the State knew, well in advance of the
trial, that they were going to call Kassie McArthur as a witness.
Yet, until McArthur was called on day two of the jury trial, the
defense was not on notice that she would be called.

The United

States Supreme Court recognized that the prosecutor in a criminal
case has a duty to disclose this kind of information when
requested: "[wjhen the prosecutor receives a specific and
relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if
ever, excusable."

United

States

v.

Agurs,

S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

427 U.S. 97, 107, 96
The Utah Supreme Court

spelled out the duties of the criminal prosecutor as to discovery
in State v.

Kallin,

877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994):

In criminal prosecutions, the State has two
independent obligations to provide evidence to the
defense. First, the State has a duty under the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution to
provide, without request by the defendant, all
exculpatory evidence. State
v. Worthen,
765 P.2d 839,
850 (Utah 1988); State
v. Carter,
707 P.2d 656, 662
(Utah 1985) . Second, when required by court order, the
State must disclose evidence pursuant to Rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The practice in this
state, at least in some districts, is for the prosecutors
to make all inculpatory evidence available to the defense
on request. See Utah R.Crim.P. 16(a) (3) .
Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory evidence
under court order or on request, they have a duty to
comply fully and forthrightly. In State
v. Knight,
734
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P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah 1987), this Court held that when
the prosecution makes a voluntary disclosure of
inculpatory evidence to a defendant, the prosecution must
produce all the requested material or identify those
portions not disclosed. If evidence is disclosed, the
prosecutor has a continuing obligation to disclose newly
acquired information so as to avoid misleading the
defense.
Kallin,

877 P.2d at 143.
The State had already responded in part to Appellant's

discovery request; the State had disclosed to Appellant the
witnesses who were to be called, short of McArthur.

The non-

disclosure was more than just a procedural irregularity; it
turned the trial of Appellant into a contest between the State
and Appellant rather than being a search for truth. As the Utah
Supreme Court remarked in State

v. Carter,

707 P.2d 656 (Utah

1985):
As we have several times noted, a criminal proceeding
is more than an adversarial contest between two competing
sides. It is a search for truth upon which a just
judgment may be predicated. Procedural rules are
designed to promote that objective, not frustrate it.
When a request or an order for discovery is made pursuant
to Sec. 77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must comply. To meet
basic standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is
a real quest for truth and not simply a contest between
the parties to win, a defendant's request for information
which has been voluntarily complied with, or a court
order of discovery must be deemed to be a continuing
request. And even though there is no court-ordered
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly
discovered inculpatory information which falls with the
ambit of Sec. 77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made
a voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead
defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
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Carter,

707 P.2d at 662
In not granting the Appellant's Motion for a Mistrial,

and in not continuing sua

sponte

the trial for at least some time

to allow the defense to prepare adequately for the testimony of
McArthur, the Appellant was denied a fair trial.
The testimony of McArthur was extremely damaging to
Appellant's case.

McArthur testified that she had witnessed the

pursuit between the police and Appellant (R.,

p. 685, LI. 19-25).

She also testified that Appellant had asked her to tell police
that she had not seen Appellant throwing anything, even though
that would not be true [R.,

p. 686, LI. 21-24).

McArthur did

give a statement to law enforcement — a copy of which was not
disclosed, again, to Appellant (R.,
7) .

p. 687, 1. 20 - p. 688, 1.

The State had McArthur read portions of the statement which

referred to Appellant physically threatening her to make
exculpatory statements in his behalf to police (R.,

p. 689, 1. 22

- p. 691, 1. 5 ) .
Hence, this witness was an acquaintence of the Appellant,
was there (or close to) at the time of the events that led to
Appellant's arrest, and testified that, not only did he confess
to her that he had thrown a bag of methamphetamine, but he also
threatened her if she did not give certain testimony to law
enforcement — itself a separate crime, that being witness
tampering.
State
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While Appellant's counsel was able to cross-examine
McArthur regarding the statement given to law enforcement, had
Appellant known that the State was planning on calling her as a
witness, Appellant, along with Appellant's counsel and the
private investigator who was working for the Appellant, could
have assisted Appellant in preparing for McArthur's testimony.
This certainly constitutes the kind of credible argument
that the defense was impaired by the non-disclosures by the
State.

Let us note, it is not just the non-disclosure of

McArthur as a witness, but the allied non-disclosure of the
statement given by McArthur to law enforcement.
here is outlined in State

v. Knight,

The next step

Supra at 921:

Therefore, when the defendant can make a credible
argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the
defense, it is up to the State to persuade the court that
there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error,
the outcome of trial would have been more favorable for
the defendant.
Given the devestating nature of McArthur's testimony, it
is highly likely that McArthur's testimony was outcome
determinative...but may not have been had the Appellant had time
to prepare.

What happened in this case is precisely what had

happened in Salt

Lake City

1993) . Like in Reynolds,

v. Reynolds,

849 P.2d 582 (Utah App.

this is not a case of the prosecutor

complying fully with the discovery request.

This is not a case

of the prosecutor partially complying with the discovery request.
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This is not a case of the prosecutor refusing to comply with the
discovery request, and then seeking to justify that refusal.
This is a case of the prosecutor ignoring

the discovery request.

Given that response (or lack thereof), the Appellant could
logically assume that it did not exist; i.e., that McArthur would
not be called as a witness.

Appellant was thus denied a

reasonable opportunity to compel disclosure of the information
the State had in their file regarding McArthur.
provided by McArthur was highly prejudicial.

The testimony

Hence, the

conviction sould be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
POINT II. WAS THE APPELLANT PREJUDICED UNFAIRLY BY
HAVING A DEFENSE WITNESS APPEAR BEFORE THE JURY IN SHACKLES AND
PRISON CLOTHING?
As noted in the facts above, Defense counsel objected to
Mr. Randall appearing before the jury dressed in jail overalls
and in shackles (R.,

p. 460, LI. 3-7). The Court overruled the

objection {R. , p. 461, 1. 20 - p. 462, 1. 8) and Mr. Randall
(R.,

testified before the jury in shackles and prisoner's clothes
p. 463 - p. 482).
A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is a
fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment.
v.

Williams,

(1976); State

Estelle

425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126
v.

Mitchell,

824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991).

While the right to remain without shackles, and thus retain the
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"garb of innocence" is a right retained by the Defendant, it
should be extended as well to witnesses for the Defendant,
especially where non-jail clothing is provided, and there is no
perceived security threat.

For the Defendant to have a witness

testify in shackles and jail overalls is probably the same as not
having a witness at all.

For the trial court to have allowed the

witness to testify in such a way deprived the Appellant of a fair
trial; the verdict should be overturned and remanded for a new
trial.
III. WAS THE APPELLANT PREJUDICED UNFAIRLY BY THE COURT
ORDERING A WITNESS TRANSPORTED PRIOR TO BEING CALLED AS A DEFENSE
WITNESS?
Again, under an analysis of the Appellant having the
right to a fair trial, Estelle,

supra,

Mitchell,

supra,

Appellant's witness was unavailable to be called, as the Court
had returned him to the Kane County Jail prior to the conclusion
of the trial [R.,

p. 677, LI. 12-18), contravening the Court's

own transportation order (R.,

pp. 114-115).

The Court denied

Appellant's request to call Kim Randall to testify in the
Appellant's case in chief, and required defense counsel to give a
proffer of Mr. Randall's proposed testimony (R.,

p. 678, LI. 6-

10) . The defense moved for a mistrial and that motion was denied
[R.,

p. 679, 1. 24 - p. 680, 1. 5).
While the Court found that the testimony proffered was

"cumulative" to what was testified the day before (Id.),
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counsel was caught off guard, and was not able to articulate the
full range of questioning that he was planning on asking the
witness.

Further, the answers to questions on direct testimony

could have elicited questions beyond those stated to the Court by
counsel.
Appellant has the burden of producing a marshalling of
the evidence, and thus must point out that the Utah Supreme Court
has held that "we will not set aside a verdict because of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence
appears of record, and we believe that the excluded evidence
would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about
a different verdict." State
1986).

v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah

While the excluded testimony from the witness, by itself,

may not be enough to conclude that the Appellant did not receive
a fair trial, it should be taken in light of the other errors at
trial, not the least of which was the rebuttal witness called as
a surprise by the prosecution.

It is unknown whether Randall

could have provided rebuttal testimony to the testimony of
McArthur, but the testimony of McArthur was not known until the
day of trial, and even if Randall could have impeached her
testimony, he was in Kane County.

Based on these concerns, this

error, in concert with all other errors discussed in Appellant's
Brief, the cumulative impact of the inadmissible testimony and
evidence created reversible error by tending to prejudice the
State
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rights of the Appellant.

"'Cumulative error' refers to a number

of errors which prejudice [a] defendant's rights to a fair
Bundy v. Deland,

trial."
Ellis,

763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988); State

748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987);

501-02 (Utah 1986); See also

State

State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498,
v. St.

282 P.2d 323 (1955); Gooden v. State,

denied,

Clair,

3 Utah 2d 230,

617 P.2d 248

(Okla.Crim.App.1980); State v. McKenzie,
428, 448, cert,

v.

186 Mont. 481, 608 P.2d

449 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 626, 66 L.Ed.2d

507 (1980).
IV.
WAS THE DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO BE CONVICTED OF A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES ONLY?
A.

IS THE OFFENSE OF FAILURE TO PAY DRUG STAMP
TAX A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE?

Under Utah law, a criminal defendant cannot be convicted
of both a stated crime and a lesser crime that is necessarily
included in the proof of the greater.
(Brooks

II),

See State

v.

Brooks

908 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1995); State v. Bradley,

P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1985)(per curiam); State v. Hill,
96, 97 (Utah 1983).

752

674 P.2d

A thorough analysis requires two steps:

first, a theoretical comparison of the elements of the crimes
claimed to be in a lesser included relationship.
supra

at 861.

Brooks

II,

Such a theoretical comparison of the elements of

Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute,
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and Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax, is as follows:
Possession

of a Controlled

Substance

with

Intent

to Distribute

(a

second degree felony):
1.

The Defendant knowingly and intentionally

2.

Possessed a controlled substance

3.

In Washington County, State of Utah

4.

With the intent to distribute,

Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv).
Failure

to Pay Drug Stamp Tax

1.

The Defendant knowingly and intentionally

2.

In Washington County, State of Utah

3.

Possessed a controlled substance (as defined in Utah Code
Annotated §58-37-2)

4.

And be a dealer of the controlled substance, meaning that
the amount of the controlled substance must measure at
least seven grams,

5.

For which he did not pay the requisite tax.

Utah Code Annotated §§59-19-102, 104 & 105,
In both of the statutes, it is necessary for the
Defendant charged to possess a controlled substance. Both
statutes also look to the quantity of controlled substances
possessed.

In the case of Possession with Intent to Distribute,

the Courts have held that the quantity of the controlled
substance is indicative of whether or not there was intent to
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant
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distribute.

"Where one possesses a controlled substance in a

quantity too large for personal consumption, the trier of fact
State

can infer that the possessor had an intent to distribute.
v. Anderton,

Utah, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1983)."

709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985).

State

v.

Fox,

The Drug Stamp Tax statute

requires that the person possessing the controlled substance be a
"dealer", which is statutorily defined as one having been found
possessing over 7 grams of the controlled substance.

Hence, both

will look to the quantity of the substance to determine whether
the law has been violated.

Thus far, the evidence to support a

conviction of Possession with Intent to Distribute necessarily
includes evidence of Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax.
The Drug Stamp Tax statute does require that the accused
purchase a drug stamp, a requirement not found in Possession with
Intent to Distribute.

However, it is generally recognized that

the Drug Stamp Tax act is one that is uniformly not complied
with.

Appellant is unaware of any case in which a defendant

arrested with a sizeable quantity of a controlled substance
actually had a drug stamp affixed to it.

In every other way, a

conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute necessarily includes conviction of failure to pay
drug stamp tax.

Hence, Failure to Pay Drug Stamp Tax should be

considered to be a lesser included offense of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, and the
State
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Appellant's conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute should be dismissed.
B.

IS THE OFFENSE OF FAILURE TO RESPOND TO
OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF RECKLESS DRIVING?

The analysis here is the same as POINT IV A above.

The

elements of Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop are
as follows:
1.

The Defendant knowingly and intentionally

2.

In Washington County, State of Utah

3.

Having received a visual signal from a peace officer to
bring his vehicle to a stop

4.

Operates his vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of
the officer's signal

5.

So as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a
peace officer by vehicle or other means.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-13.5(1)
The elements of reckless driving are:
1.

The Defendant knowingly and intentionally

2.

In Washington County, State of Utah

3.

Operated a motor vehicle in willful or wanton disregard
for the safety of persons or property.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-43.
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In the Failure to Respond statute, the element of willful
or wanton disregard of the officer's signal to stop is akin to a
willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property, as that will be the logical outcome of such a disregard
of the officer's signal.

Hence, conviction of Failure to Respond

necessarily includes a conviction of Reckless Driving, and the
conviction of Failure to Respond should be overturned.
POINT V: WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE GIVEN TO THE JURY
FOR THE RETURN OF A CONVICTION OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE?
According to Officer Stoker, the Appellant was throwing
objects away during the high speed chase.

When this happened,

Officer Stoker was chasing the Appellant on Southbound Interstate
15, where the highway by and over various streets in St. George
(JR., p. 329, 1. 13 - p. 331, 1. 14). Officer Stoker testified
that the chase ended at the South St. George 1-15 off-ramp where
the Appellant's motorcycle ran into the a backup officer's patrol
car (R.,

p. 333, LI. 2-8). The Appellant was then arrested.
Officer Stoker testified that after the arrest he and

several other law enforcement officers went back to the freeway
to search for the items he had seen thrown by the Appellant(R.,
p # 343, LI. 1-11).

He did not ever find the first item that he

saw the Appellant throw.

(R. , p. 369, LI. 7-9). He did find

several pieces of hypodermic syringes (R.,
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and later found a small plastic bag with a white powdery
substance inside of it (R.,

p. 346, LI. 2-10).

Jon Gerlitz from the State Crime Lab, in his testimony,
identified the substance in the plastic bag as being 26.3 grams
of methamphetamine (R, p. 451, LI. 10-12).
Testimony was received from Officer Staley that 1-15,
between the Nevada border and 1-70 (north of St. George) is a
major drug corridor, with drugs coming traveling on 1-15 from
"everywhere" {R.,

p. 531, 1. 6 - p. 532, 1. 8). The question

here is whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the
jury to reasonably tie in the drugs found with the Appellant.
The officer saw two items being thrown; one, what the officer
thought was a handgun, was never recovered [R.,

p. 385, LI. 2-3).

Near the point on 1-15 where the officer saw the Appellant throw
a baggie, he found a bag with syringes and plungers (R.,
LI. 12-17).

p. 376,

Officer Stoker only testified to seeing two items

thrown from the motorcycle during the pursuit, and one was not
described as a baggie.

The baggie found by Officer Stoker which

contained the large quantity of methamphetamine was not in the
same area where he saw items thrown; in fact, it was on the other
side of the highway (R., p. 382, LI. 8-17).
The standard used by the Utah Supreme Court for
determining sufficiency of the evidence is "to require that it be
so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds
State v. Kenneth D. Souza - Brief of Appellant
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could not reasonably believe defendant had committed a crime.
Unless there is a clear showing of lack of evidence, the jury
verdict will be upheld."
1976)(footnotes omitted).

State

v. Romero,

554 P.2d 216 (Utah

While that is a high burden, Appellant

believes that it is met here.

Not only is the baggie in an area

different from where the officer believed the baggie was thrown,
but that area of 1-15 was known by law enforcement as a major
drug corridor, with literally hundreds of other vehicles that
could have left the baggie with the methamphetamine in it. The
lack of evidence tying this baggie to the Appellant leaves the
sufficiency of the evidence given to the jury in doubt, and their
verdict as well.
POINT VI:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING APPELLANT/DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES?
The Appellant was found guilty of all counts by the jury
(R.,

p. 759, 1. 10 - p. 760, 1. 9). The Appellant chose to waive

the time for sentencing (R. , p. 762, LI. 20-24), and the Court
sentenced the Appellant to two consecutive terms of imprisonment
of not less than one year and not more than fifteen years. The
Appellant was also sentenced to serve two concurrent zero to five
year terms and two concurrent County jail terms of six months
with the balance of the two six month terms being suspended

(R.,

p. 769, 1. 20-p. 772, 1. 10). The Court did so without a
presentence report or any other objective information regarding
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the Appellant's history, character and rehabilitative needs,
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-401 reads, in relevant portion, as
follows:
(1)

A Court shall determine, if a defendant has been
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense,
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state
offenses shall run concurrently unless the Court
states in the sentence that they shall run
consecutively.

(3)

A court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant
in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences.

* * * * *

Clearly, first, is a presumption of concurrent sentences in §763-401(1).

Consecutive sentences, per subsection (3),

shall

consider several factors, not the least of which are "the
history, character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant"
before imposing a consecutive sentence.
This statute has been reviewed previously.
Lee,

In State

v.

656 P.2d 443 (Utah 1982), Lee was contesting his committment

to consecutive sentences, similarly questioning whether the judge
complied with subsection (3). While the Utah Supreme Court there
found that the judge's sentence was justified, it also referred
to a presentence report that was prepared in that case to justify
its decision.

Lee, supra

at 444.

In State

v.

Deli,

861 P.2d 431

(Utah 1993), while there is no mention of a presentence report
having been prepared, the Court does discuss the fact that Deli
State
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had previously been incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, and
that he was a fugitive from justice when the underlying crimes
were committed, Id at 435, suggesting information available to
the trial court commonly obtained through a presentence report.
In the instant case, the Trial Court noted its lack of
information at the time of sentencing:
As you well know, the matters before the Court are
serious. Each of them carry 1 to 15 years incarceration
in the Utah State Prison, and that is by legislative
determination.

Without

further

information,

with only

the bold recordof the facts and circumstances that I have
heard during trial, I am given little, if any
opportunity, to more carefully review this matter.
R.,

p. 763, LI. 4-11, emphasis added.
The Court then later remarked:
I may not have the ability to do much other than to
impose the sentence. If you wish me to do so, and it is
my job and my duty I will do that if it is your request,

but I would be remiss if I told you that
benefit
from a presentence
report.
R.,

I would not

p. 763, 1. 22 - p. 764, 1. 2.
The Appellant did briefly address the Court (R.,

also

p. 765,

1. 16 - p. 766, 1. 17). The prosecutor then addressed the Court
and recommended consecutive sentences, based on Appellant' having
previously been incarcerated in California and Appellant's
criminal history (R. , p. 766, 1. 20 - p. 767, 1. 6), although
there was no depth in discussing either the incarceration or the
criminal history.

Appellant then addressed the Court in

rebuttal, and discussed briefly his past and his ability to be
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rehabilitated (R. , p. 767, 1. 16 - p. 769, 1. 3). The Court then
proceeded to have the sentence on counts I and II run consecutive
[R. , p. 770, LI. 22-25).
While there was discussion of the Defendant's history,
character and rehabilitative needs, none of the information given
to the judge was by disinterested parties.

Prior to imposing

consecutive sentences, the judge should have insisted on a
presentence report, or not sentenced Appellant to consecutive
sentences.

Hence, Appellant requests this Court to vacate his

current sentence and remand this matter back to trial court for
sentencing in accordance with §76-3-401(3).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant requests that this
Court find that the conviction of Appellant was in error, and
that the conviction be reversed, with a remand to the trial court
for a new trial.

In the alternative, Appellant requests that the

sentence imposed be vacated, and the case be remanded to the
trial court to determine what an appropriate sentence should be
for the Appellant.
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ADDENDUM
Attached hereto is a copy of the transcript of the
videotape regarding Appellant's Motion to Compel, which was heard
on September 27, 1995.

The Court Reporter filed the original of

this transcript with the District Court rather than with the
Court of Appeals, and the original had not yet made it to the
Court's Record at the time of the writing of Appellant's Brief.
Hence, Appellant provides a copy of the transcript as an
Addendum.
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ST. GEORGE, WASH., CO., UT., WED., SEPT. 27, 1995
-oOoP R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

Item 41 on the calendar,

951500570, State of Utah versus Kenneth Duane
Souza.

Mr. Souza is present, together with his

counsel, Mr. Scarth.

Mr. Scarth, Mr. Souza you

claim is indigent, and you need transcripts and an
investigator.

Is that what you're looking for as

well as a motion to compel discovery?
MR. SCARTH:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
All right.

I'll hear you with

respect, first, to indigency.
MR. SCARTH:

Okay.

And -- those two

items, and then at the end I'll request the
opportunity to address the bail situation.

So some

of my remarks will apply to the request for
appointment of an investigator, transcripts.

Some

will apply to bail, but they -- they're -- I think
they're all applicable to those two.
Your Honor, Mr. Souza has been in jail
since the 2nd of July.
at 50,000 cash only.

In this case he has bail set
There was another insubsequent

case wherein bail was set at 10,000 cash only, but
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that casej has been dismissed by this Court
recently.
At the time he was brought before the
Court on the case that's now been dismissed, this
Court revoked his bail, which had been posted by
Beehive Bail Bonding, in the form of a bond,
$15,000.

Since he's been incarcerated, his mother

has become seriously ill .

I have an exhibit in that

respect, and I'll give a copy to counsel.
The reason of that is relevant, Your
Honor, is -- is that Mr. SOU2:a has a 14-year -old
daughter and he has the care, custody, and control
of her, and she's been with his mother in Myton,
Utah since February of 1994.

And her mother -- his

mother is now unable to financially support Mr.
Souza's daughter.
What I'm leading up to, Your Honor, is
since he's been incarcerated since July 2nd he's
been unemployed, been and unable to meet any of
those obligations.

He has extinguished his assets

as a result of lawyer fees, and there's just nothing
left.
His mother is scheduled for open-heart
surgery.

He needs to be out working, and so if the

Court does grant the motion it may be on -- the
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motion for transcripts and funds for an
investigator, it may be on a temporary basis.

If

the Court would review it later, it might find that
he's employed and no longer entitled to those
items.

But as I say I'm also addressing the bail

question.
He has located employment in Myton.

He

needs to be there living with his mother and
daughter.

He would work for American Towing, which

is owned by Robert Essex in Myton.

He has -- Mr.

Souza has worked there before.

In fact, he sold

that business to Robert Essex.

The defendant, as I

probably already mentioned, plans to live in Myton
with his mother and daughter.
THE COURT:

When is the surgery scheduled,

counsel?
THE DEFENDANT:

I'm not sure, Your Honor.

I talked to my mother last night.
scheduled it.
date.

(Inaudible.)

It's soon, though.

Her doctor has

I didn't ask for a
She has had one bypass --

triple bypass this year, and she's having heart
failure again.

And not only she's not financially

able to support my daughter, physically she's -- and
I've raised her since she's four years old.
straight "A" student.

She's a good girl.

She's a
And by me
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not being there, she's somewhat getting herself in a
little bit of trouble because my mother is not able
to supervise her.
MR. SCARTH:
evicted.

Also his mother is being

She's without funds.

The child, of

course, needs school clothing and other things.
But in connection with the motion for
transcript and investigator, I have talked with an
investigator, that's Mr. Jack Lasswell of St.
George, Utah.

He's present in the courtroom.

He's

prepared to state to the Court or testify to the
Court as to his fees.
What we would need to be investigated is
that my client advises that he recognized the
occupants of other vehicles during the alleged high
speed chase.

We need to have them investigated.

need some photographs taken.
THE COURT:
counsel?

So it's --

Have you got a ceiling on it,

Can I authorize up to a given dollar

figure?
MR. SCARTH:

Yeah.

For now, I think a

thousand dollars would be -- would cover it, Your
Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. SCARTH:

We

Okay.
On transcripts, we need a
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transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case.
I reserve the right to file motions that would
normally be filed at arraignment time.
file a motion for quash and remand.

I intend to

I need a

transcript for that purpose.
I think I've already mentioned it on the
bail issue.
specifically.

Well, let me address that a little more
The statute, which is Section

77-20-1, and I'll hand a copy to the Court and
counsel.
THE COURT:

I have it hear, counsel, if I

need to look at it.
MR. SCARTH:
counsel.

All right.

Provides as follows:

I'll hand one to

A person charged

with, arrested for a criminal offense shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right except if the
person is charged with (A) and then subparagraph (B)
felony while on probation or parole or while free on
bail awaiting trial on a previous felony charge when
there is substantial evidence to support the current
charge, or, felony, when there is substantial
evidence to support the charge and the Court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other
person or to the community or is likely to flee
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jurisdiction'-- the jurisdiction of the Court if
released on bail.
Mr. Souza has had business in this court
prior to these two recent arrests.

To my knowledge,

he's never failed to appear so the flight risk isn't
a problem.

There's been no evidence presented or

was no evidence presented when the Court revoked
bail and set it at 50,000 cash only, that there was,
under subparagraph B, substantial evidence to
support that charge or the one in Kane County.
There was no substantial evidence
presented, and I doubt that there will be any
presented today, by a clear and convincing standard
that this person would constitute a substantial
danger to any other person or to the community.
I have those two matters.

So

I'll address the motion

to compel now or -- (inaudible.)
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

Let's hear your

motion to compel.
MR. SCARTH:

On the motion to compel, I

also have some exhibits, Your Honor.
copies to counsel.

I'll hand

Your Honor, early in the stages

of this case I filed more or less a routine motion
to discover.

Thereafter, on August 1, 1995, I sent

a letter - - a n informal letter to Mr. Ludlow
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requesting a document as discovery, that document
being the St. George City Police Department's
portion of their policies and procedures that apply
to fresh pursuit.
Mr. Ludlow made, I believe, reasonable
efforts to produce that but then had to advise me
that the Chief of Police would not turn that
document over to him for copying and supply me with
a copy at which point I filed, under the GRAMMA Act
in Utah, a records request of the City of St. George
requesting that item.
Thereafter, as you'll see from the
exhibit, I got a notice of denial.
that document?

Why do we need

We need that document, Your Honor,

because the police reports indicate that during the
alleged hot pursuit or fresh pursuit that the
patrolling officer traveled up to speeds of 115
miles per hour.
I believe that I may find in those
policies that that's a violation of St. George City
Police's policies, and if it is, that would go to
the credibility of the officer, and it would also
lead me into an area of if he would violate that
policy or that procedure, would he violate others in
this investigation and arrest.

I'll submit it.
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All right.

Counsel, with

respect to your discovery motion, your request is
denied.

The Court looks at the matter and

determines it as follows:

The existence of a speed

limit cap on a fresh or hot pursuit policy of the
St. George City Police Department, and whether or
not such a cap was exceeded by the pursuing officer
in this matter -- and I take specific notice that I
was the judge who heard the preliminary hearing in
this matter and listened to the testimony carefully
and have that testimony clearly in mind at this time
-- the Court's determination is that whether or not
that officer at the time either intentionally or
inadvertently determined to violate that cap is
wholly and entirely collateral to the issues of this
case.
I do not find that there is a significant
connection for relevance terms between that policy
and the actions of the officer and the credibility
of the officer under this case under the
circumstances that the officer was, in fact, in hot
pursuit behind a vehicle that was not responding to
his signal to stop, that the officer observed items
being thrown from that vehicle and testified as
such, and I see no causal connection.

Based upon
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that, I deny your discovery motion.
have got your record.

Mr. Scarth, you

Do you need any further

delineation on that?
MR. SCARTH:

No.

I think you have given

your grounds, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right.

Now, with respect

to the determination of indigency, Mr. Ludlow,
what's the State's position on that?
MR. LUDLOW:

Your Honor, the State

believes that Mr. Souza has retained counsel, some
of the things he's asking for I believe that Mr.
Scarth can provide as part of his representation.
We would also like the Court to inquire into Mr.
Souza's indigency status by going through a hearing
to determine that.
THE COURT:

I would ordinarily swear Mr.

Souza at this time, counsel, to make that
determination.
MR. SCARTH:
THE COURT:

That's fine.
Mr. Souza, would you, again,

as best you can, raise your right hand and take an
oath.
(Whereupon, Kenneth Duane Souza
was sworn by the judge.)
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you have a job,
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sir?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

You have been incarcerated

since July the 2nd of 1995, and that's accurate,
sir?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

All right.

Do you have any

personal property by way of motor vehicles, bank
accounts, furnitures, fixtures, anything not subject
to -- not exempt from execution worth more than
$500?
THE DEFENDANT:

Well, yes and no.

If Mr.

Ludlow would return some of my stuff -THE COURT:

Well, if it is in police

custody, it is probably not -THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

-- to be counted.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I don't have nothing.

Absolutely nothing.

All right.

Do you own any

land or real estate anywhere, sir?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, sir, I do not.

All right.

Mr. Ludlow, any

areas of inquiry you think we ought to cover?
MR. LUDLOW:

No, I believe that covers it,

Your Honor.
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Mr. Souza, I find that you are

2

in deed indigent.

3

transcripts will be paid for by Washington County.

4

Accordingly, the cost of

MR. LUDLOW:

Your Honor, before the Court

5

makes that determination, I received a letter from

6

Mr. Souza, and if I could have the bailiff -- this

7

indicates he has a motor vehicle that's valued at

8

$5,000 that does not a have a lien on it,

9

lienholder's or any claim.

10

St. George Police does

have that vehicle in impound right now.

11

I think that -- that perhaps, well, with

12

an order of the Court, we could sell that vehicle or

13

do whatever and that would provide for the things

14

that he's asking for, transcripts, investigator

15

fees, whatever.

16

as what he is claiming the value of that motor

17

vehicle.

18
19

I believe he does have $5,000 here

THE COURT:

What is the authority of the

police department to hold this asset, counsel?

20

MR. LUDLOW:

Your Honor, we have had that

21

vehicle.

Mr. Souza claims that that is his

22

vehicle.

He's never provided any documentation.

23

There's another gentleman who also claims ownership

24

to that vehicle.

25

Police Department and the City Attorney's Office,

So the position of St. George
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1

until they receive documentation as to whose vehicle

2

that is, they don't want to release it to anyone.

3
4

THE DEFENDANT:

Your Honor, if I may say

something, please.

5

THE COURT:

No.

Counsel, my concern is
He is facing a most

k

6

Mr. Souza is now in custody.

7

serious felony charge, and if there are resources

8

here that can be used, if he's got a claim to the

9

vehicle, I don't think this is the appropriate forum

10

in which to adjudicate title of that vehicle.

11

don't even know who the other person is.

12

I

I'm going to determine that if St. George

13

City is holding onto it, for reasons known only to

14

themselves, Mr. Souza certainly doesn't have access

15

to it.

16

can't determine at this point.

17

Whether he does or doesn't have title, I

The Court's order is that he'll have

18

transcripts.

I will authorize payment of $500 for

19

investigator expense, and if that is not enough, Mr.

20

Scarth, come back to the Court and we'll see where

21

we are there.

22

MR. SCARTH:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Thank you, Your Honor.
Anything else, Mr. Scarth?

You want to submit the bail issue?
MR. SCARTH:

Yes.

As to bail, Your Honor,
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1

I would request the Court to reinstate Beehive Bail

2

Bonding $15,000 bond, and I've stated my reasons.

3

The main reasons revolves around his mother and his

4

daughter and their need to have him with them and to

5

have him out working to provide for them.

6

THE COURT:

All right.

Counsel, I take

7

that well in mind, and I am more than slightly

8

troubled by Mr. Souza's mother's physical condition

9

and her inability to care for a 14-year-old child.

10

But this Court found by not only probable cause, but

11

I will put it on the record now, from the

12

preliminary hearing, this Court found clear and

13

convincing evidence, that it was described to this

14

Court as a fist-sized rock of methamphetamine was

15

recovered in the investigation of this case.

16

Methamphetamine is, in fact, responsible

17

for the majority of the criminal cases -- active

18

criminal cases on this Court's docket at the present

19

time.

20

and present danger to this community.

21

convincing evidence, Mr. Souza falls into that

22

category.

Those who possess such quantities are a clear
By clear and

Your bail request is denied.

23

MR. LUDLOW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

24

MR. SCARTH:

Your Honor, it's presently

25

set at 50,000 cash only.

Could that be cash or

VAN FLEET COURT REPORTING (801) 652-9971
P.O. Box 2702, St. George, Utah 84771-2702

15
951500570

9-27-95

bond?
THE COURT:

Cash only is the order,

MR. LUDLOW:

Thank you, Your Honor,

(Thereupon, the proceedings
were concluded.)
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